日仏Workshop「論理とリーズニングにおける不一致」及び「サイバーセキュリティ研究人文社会系アプローチ: EU Horizon 2020プロジェクト」セッション

France-Japan Workshop on “Disagreement in Logic and Reasoning” and a Special Session on “A Humanity and Social Science Approach to Cybersecurity Research: An EU Horizon 2020 Project”

Mar 2nd, 2024, at Keio University
日時:2024年3月2日(土)
日本時間9:40-18:35 (JST)

プログラムの最新情報はこちら / The Workshop Website is HERE, open on Feb 23rd.
https://abelard.flet.keio.ac.jp/japan_france_workshop_and_cybersecurity_research_and_discussion_session_2024



事前登録 / Pre-registration

事前登録はこちら (要事前登録): https://forms.gle/rcv8iu6svAGJPsbNA

Preregistration is HERE (required) : https://forms.gle/rcv8iu6svAGJPsbNA

対面討論を主体としますがオンライン参加もできます。登録様式にどちらの形での参加を予定されているかをご記入ください。対面参加の場合も事前登録フォームから登録してください。
The workshop is in a hybrid format. Please fill out the preregistration form to indicate how you plan to participate. Please register using the preregistration form, even if you are attending in person.




「不一致」の理解とその克服に向けた研究がさまざまな分野でなされています。一般に「不一致」の成立にはその根底的なレベルで多くの「一致」が前提されていると考えられ、論理やリーズニングのレベルの一致もそのような前提の一部と捉える観点もあり得るでしょう。論理やリーズニングのレベルの不一致があり得るのか、あるとしたらどのような不一致なのか、その不一致の克服はいかにして可能か、また、論理とリーズニングの不一致研究が他分野の不一致および不一致の克服研究に貢献し得るのか、等を話題として日仏ワークショップシリーズを開催しています。これまでの論理の哲学や数学の哲学の論争もこの「不一致」の観点から、論争として成立しているのかも含めて問い直す形で検討します。今回は4回目となります。
これに加えて、我々が生活するサイバースペースの諸問題をFilmsやTV-Seriesの収集・分析を通じて哲学的に検討しているEU 2020Horizon プロジェクトとのディスカッションセッションも行います。


会場 / Venue

慶應義塾大学三田キャンパス東館6階G-Lab / G-Lab, 6th floor, East Building, Mita Campus, Keio University
(7 minutes walk from JR-Tamachi, Subway Mita or Akabanebashi)

キャンパスマップ 13番の建物: https://www.keio.ac.jp/ja/maps/mita.html
Campus Map Building #13: https://www.keio.ac.jp/en/maps/mita.html


プログラム / PROGRAM

ABSTRACTS are listed below.


Part 1 France-Japan Workshop on “Disagreement in Logic and Reasoning”

 9:45-9:50   Opening


 9:50-10:50  Jocelyn Benoist (Université Paris-1)

“so-called relativist logic, its purpose and its limits”

11:50-11:00  Break


11:00-11:40  Hirohiko Abe (Guest Independent Researcher)

“Deep Disagreement and Sentimentalist Epistemology”

11:40-12:20 Introduction of the Presentations of the March Paris Meetings

  • Onyu Mikami (Tokyo Metropolitan University)
    “Elucidating others’ concepts — Towards mutual understanding beyond translation —”
  • Yuichiro Hosokawa (Gunma Prefectural Women's University)
    “Disagreement Among Analyses of Counterfactuals”
  • Ryo Ito (Waseda University)
    “Expression, Extension, and Disagreement about rules”
  • Kengo Okamoto (Tokyo Metropolitan University)
    “How to Spell Out Implicit Logical Dependencies”
  • Mitsuhuro Okada (Keio University)
    “New roles of contexts and syntactic interpretations in the traditional logical disputes”

12:20-13:30  Lunch Break


13:30-14:30  Sandra Laugier (Université Paris-1)

“Disagreement in language and disagreement in ethics”

14:30-14:40  Break


14:40-15:30  Yasushi Hirai (Keio University) Special Guest Speaker

“Philosophy Navigating the Boundaries: Case Studies in Bergsonian Research”

15:30-15:35  Break


15:35-16:15  Ryosuke Igarashi (Kyoto University)

“Kant's Theory of Concept Formation: Definitions, Expansions, and the Role of Experience”


Break 16:15-16:25



Part 2 Cybersecurity Session with the DEMOSERIES EU Project Team--Shaping Democratic Spaces: Security and TV Series

16:25-16:30  Mitsuhiro Okada (Keio University)

“Coordinator’s Introduction on the humanity science-driven studies on security of our life in cyber space”

16:30-16:35  Sandra Laugier (Université Paris-1)

“Introducing the DEMOSERIES”

16:35-17:20  Thibaut de Saint Maurice (Université Paris-1)

“Defying imagination, How to represent cybersecurity stakes in film and tv series”

17:20-17:35  Discussion Session 1


17:35-18:20  Sylvie Allouche (Lyon Catholic University and Université Paris-1)

“Metaphors of cybersecurity: a few issues”

18:20-18:35  Discussion Session 2


18:35  Closing


オーガナイザ / Organizing Committee

  • Yuichiro Hosokawa (Tokyo Metropolitan University)
  • Ryosuke Igarashi (Kyoto University)
  • Ryo Ito (Waseda University)
  • Onyu Mikami (Tokyo Metropolitan University)
  • Koji Mineshima (Keio University)
  • Mitsuhiro Okada (Keio University)
  • Kengo Okamoto (Tokyo Metropolitan University)

進行 / Coordinators

  • Hirohiko Abe
  • Mitsuhiro Okada

主催 / Host Organization

慶應義塾大学論理と感性のグローバル研究センター TO BE CONFIRMED
Global Research Center for Logic and Sensitivity, Keio University TO BE CONFIRMED

問い合わせ先 / Contact

logic[At]abelard.flet.keio.ac.jp

アブストラクト / Abstracts

Jocelyn Benoist (Université Paris-1)
“so-called relativist logic, its purpose and its limits”

TBA


Hirohiko Abe (Guest Independent Researcher)
“Deep Disagreement and Sentimentalist Epistemology”

Robert Fogelin introduced the notion of deep disagreements, which are disagreements on framework propositions. He also argued that in deep disagreements, arguments are pointless and rational resolution is impossible. According to Drew Johnson, intellectual humility provides a non-rational yet constructive approach to resolving deep disagreements. Being epistemically humble enables one to be open to changing their worldviews and to reduce their confidence in their fundamental commitments. In this talk, I expand Johnson’s idea from the viewpoint of sentimentalist epistemology, which posits that emotion is essentially involved in epistemic justification. I argue that intellectual humility involves being receptive to people with different perspectives and being ready to initiate arguments. Intellectual humility not only opens up the possibility of changing one’s worldview but also enables the exchange of reasons. Furthermore, I argue that an epistemic community that emphasizes intellectual humility as its core norm holds intrinsic epistemic value.


Sandra Laugier (Université Paris-1)
“Disagreement in language and disagreement in ethics”

Wittgenstein speaks about an 'agreement in language' and in form of life (PI 241-242). It is of the first importance that Wittgenstein says that we agree in and not e.g. on language. That means that we are not agents of the agreement, that language precedes agreement just as much as agreement makes language possible, and that this circularity amounts to an irreducible skepticism. As Cavell puts it, “we cannot have agreed beforehand to all that would be necessary”. The question of language agreement and disagreement in "what we say" becomes ethical.


Yasushi Hirai (Keio University)
“Philosophy Navigating the Boundaries: Case Studies in Bergsonian Research”

TBA


Ryosuke Igarashi (Kyoto University)
“Kant's Theory of Concept Formation: Definitions, Expansions, and the Role of Experience”

This presentation focuses on the theory of concept formation as developed in Kant's transcendental logic. The theory of concept formation deals with how we acquire and expand "concepts" through experiences, among other means. While Kant himself did not use the term "concept formation," recent scholars have extensively discussed Kant's contributions to this area (cf. Anderson 2015; Vanzo 2017; Wang 2021; McAndrew 2021, 2022). The growing interest in Kant's theory of concept formation is attributed to its relevance to formal logic, as it addresses the form and structure of "concepts," to epistemology, as it deals with the acquisition and expansion of concepts that are central to cognition, and methodology, as it relates to the conditions that lead our cognition to a complete system, as will be clarified in this presentation. In other words, the perspective of concept formation provides a unified viewpoint that runs through Kant's entire theoretical philosophy. Furthermore, the theory of concept formation has formed an intellectual tradition stretching from Hegel and Lotze to Cassirer and even Max Weber. Therefore, interpreting Kant's theoretical philosophy from the standpoint of concept formation has significant implications for its historical significance. Previous discussions on Kant's theory of concept formation have primarily focused on acquiring concepts through abstraction or expanding concepts based on the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. This presentation, however, will focus on Kant's theory of definition as developed mainly in the Critique of Pure Reason and his lectures on logic. In the "Transcendental Methodology" of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant mentions the definition of concepts in the context of contrasting mathematics and philosophy, noting that empirical concepts can never have a complete definition. This implies that the definitions of our empirical concepts remain imperfect and provisional, subject to change and modification through experience. Considering this point, this presentation will present a model of concept formation in Kant's theoretical philosophy. Here, the workings of our concept formation are understood as a dynamic activity where the acquisition and modification of (imperfect) definitions of concepts and the expansion of concepts through synthetic judgments interact within the realm of experience.


Thibaut de Saint Maurice (Université Paris-1)
“Defying imagination, How to represent cybersecurity stakes in film and tv series”

For the traditional threats of war and even the more informal threats of espionage or terrorism, the fiction of recent years has provided us with common, shared representations. But when it comes to cyber threats, we are sorely lacking in common, shared representations. How do we represent cyber threats and cyber security responses when they occur on the edge of reality? How can we ensure that cyber security is not confiscated by a group of experts? My point would be to think how film and tv series can be a ressource to educate the audiences about cybersecurity stakes especially in creating an imaginary about very technical process. The power and precision of this imaginary world is therefore essential if cybersecurity is to reach a wide audience and become part of the democratic conversation.


Sylvie Allouche (Lyon Catholic University and Université Paris-1)
“Metaphors of cybersecurity: a few issues”

Contrary to a simplistic view sometimes conveyed of science and technology as the exclusive realm of reason, they often resort to metaphors, which enable actors to better grasp their objects, but also sometimes constitute "epistemological obstacles" (Gaston Bachelard). Yet the field of cybersecurity is particularly fertile in terms of metaphors, not only when represented in popular culture, but also in the discourse of cybersecurity itself. I propose to examine a few issues of this phenomenon.