慶應義塾大学三田キャンパス東館6階G-Lab / G-Lab, 6th floor, East Building, Mita Campus, Keio University
(7 minutes walk from JR-Tamachi, Subway Mita or Akabanebashi)

キャンパスマップ 13番の建物: https://www.keio.ac.jp/ja/maps/mita.html
Campus Map Building #13: https://www.keio.ac.jp/en/maps/mita.html

 9:45-9:50   Opening

 9:50-11:20  Jocelyn Benoist (Université Paris-1)

"Wittgenstein on the ordinary / extraordinary and the mathematical / extra-mathematical”

11:20-11:30  Break

11:30-12:30  Kengo Okamoto (Tokyo Metropolitan University)

"Wittgenstein on Understanding a Mathematical Proposition – A Reconsideration from a Linear / Modal Logical Point of View”

12:30-14:00  Lunch Break

14:00-15:00  Takashi Iida (Keio University, Professor Emeritus)

"Wittgenstein and Analytic Philosophy in Japan”

15:00-15:10  Break

15:10-15:40  Mitsuhiro Okada (Keio University)

"Discontinuity, and continuity of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of arithmetic from his early period to his middle period and further”

15:40-16:20  Toshio Irie (Toho University)

"Wittgenstein on Concept-Formation”

16:20-16:30  Break

16:30-17:10  Kentaro Ozeki (University of Tokyo)

"Intentional Object in Context: Husserl, Hintikka, and Beyond”

17:10-17:50  Masahide Asano (Tokyo Metropolitan University)

"Lotze and Bolzano on Anti-psychologism and Logical Form of Concept”

17:50-18:00  Closing Discussion

18:00        Closing

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Organizers

• Mitsuhiro Okada
• Koji Mineshima

Coordinators

• Hirohiko Abe
• Koji Mineshima
• Mitsuhiro Okada
• Kentaro Ozeki

Host Organization

Global Research Center for Logic and Sensitivity, Keio University TO BE CONFIRMED

Contact：logic[At]abelard.flet.keio.ac.jp

Jocelyn Benoist (Université Paris-1)
“Wittgenstein on the ordinary / extraordinary and the mathematical / extra-mathematical”

Kengo Okamoto (Tokyo Metropolitan University)
“Wittgenstein on Understanding a Mathematical Proposition – A Reconsideration from a Linear / Modal Logical Point of View” In his Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics Part VII-16, Wittgenstein writes: “What does mathematics need a foundation (Grundlegung) for? It no more needs one, I believe, than propositions about physical objects - or about sense-impressions, need analysis”. Then he goes on to say : “What mathematical propositions do stand in need of is a clarification of their grammar　(Klärung ihrer Grammatik), just as do those other propositions”. Although it is commonplace in the Wittgenstein exegesis to stress the centrality of the notion of grammar (and that of its clarification), one might say, it is generally left unclear what he primarily meant under such a “clarification” in this and other similar remarks on mathematical propositions. I propose to connect his conception of a mathematical proposition not just with use and application in general, as has often been done, but rather much more closely with that of technik (Technik) and of calculation (Rechnung). The reason is that, as Wittgenstein urges, the peculiar character of mathematical propositions shows up only when we deliberately concentrate on their role (in particular, their new emergent possibilities of applications) amidst our mathematical activities. From this viewpoint, I will introduce and utilize some of the recent ideas from linear (modal) logic and related studies.

Takashi Iida (Keio University, Professor Emeritus)
“Wittgenstein and Analytic Philosophy in Japan” In the postwar Japan, analytic philosophy had been known by a name Kagaku-tetsugaku which means either philosophy of science or scientific philosophy. Among those philosophers who were so classified, there was a clear distinction between those who thought highly of Wittgenstein’s philosophy and those who did not. A representative of the former was Shozo Ohmori (1921-97), one of the leading philosophers of analytic philosophy in Japan. In my talk, I describe how Wittgenstein’s philosophy had been received by Japanese philosophers and influenced them, in particular, how it had contributed to the formation of Ohmori’s own philosophy.

Mitsuhiro Okada (Keio University)
“Discontinuity, and continuity of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of arithmetic from his early period to his middle period and further”

Toshio Irie (Toho University)
“Wittgenstein on Concept-Formation” Concept-formation is one of the most important themes of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, which has received little systematic study up to now. This presentation introduces the topic and explains its significance and potential in the interpretation of the philosophy of Wittgenstein and philosophy itself. First, I will discuss the prominent characters of concept-formation by focusing on Wittgenstein’s remarks about proofs in his philosophy of mathematics in which the term concept-formation originated. Then, I will observe the appearance of the topic in other fields e.g., Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language and psychology.

Kentaro Ozeki (University of Tokyo)
“Intentional Object in Context: Husserl, Hintikka, and Beyond” In Ideen I, Husserl introduces the notion of ‘noemata’ as ‘intentional correlates’ of our intentional experiences, such as believing, seeing, imagining, etc. However, despite its significance in Husserl’s theory of intentionality, the proper way to interpret noema has long been debated. Jaakko Hintikka’s “The Intentions of Intentionality” represents one of the earliest analytic attempts to resolve this issue. Building on his seminal work on epistemic and doxastic logics, Hintikka offers an interpretation of noema, in which varying contexts for intentional objects are introduced as possible worlds across which objects are identified. In this talk, I will explore the early contextual view of noemata as intentional objects and propose a revised interpretation based on the notion of the intentional world. I will also discuss the metaphysics of the actual world, or reality, within the presented framework.

Masahide Asano (Tokyo Metropolitan University)
“Lotze and Bolzano on Anti-psychologism and Logical Form of Concept” One of Lotze’s most important contributions to the history of logic was his anti-psychologism. In his Logic (1874), Lotze argued that the laws of logic cannot be reduced to any psychological processes and their reality belongs to a realm of its own, which he called “validity”. Previous studies have pointed out the parallel between Lotze’s notion of validity and Bolzano’s Satz an sich, interpreting both as asserting a kind of logical Platonism (cf. Miki 1923). However, Lotze’s anti-psychological tendencies can also be found in his earlier work. In his Logic (1843), Lotze criticized the psychologism of his contemporaries and proposed to understand logical form as generalizations of Kant’s transcendental schema. This line of thought is reflected in his understanding of a concept as a structured unity rather than a mere aggregation of its constituents. Interestingly, a parallel can also be found here. As Grohman (2023) points out, Bolzano also calls for a renewal of traditional understanding of concepts and emphasizes their syntactic structure as a characteristic of concepts (not objects) in his Wissenshaftlehre (1837). In this talk, I will compare Lotze’s and Bolzano’s views on the logical form of concepts and examine their evaluation as anti-psychologists.

事務局：logic[At]abelard.flet.keio.ac.jp