本パネルディスカッションでは、生活形式/生命形態における規範性の内在について探求します。規範は生活そのものの中でどのようにして生じるのか、個々人はどのようにして規範を表現するのか、規範は制度や異なる文化の中でどのように具現化されるのか。言語哲学、政治哲学、人類学、倫理学、芸術学を専門とするパネリストが、生命の規範の可塑性と進化、そして生活形式/生命形態における対立、乖離、断絶の事例について議論します。このパネルの目的は、社会的なもの、あるいは生物学的なものなど、生活形式/生命形態における特定の規範性、そしてそれらに起因する現在の葛藤や変異に光を当てることです。

パネリスト

• サンドラ・ロジエ
  　 パリ第1大学パンテオン・ソルボンヌ校哲学教授 （日常言語哲学、ウィトゲンシュタイン、倫理学）

• エステル・フェラレーゼ
  　 ピカルディ大学、フランス大学研究所哲学教授 （政治哲学、批判理論）

• ペリグ・ピトルー
  フランス国立科学研究センター上級研究員、オックスフォード・フランス研究所（オックスフォード大学） （生活人類学）

• タチアナ・ジュラウリョーバ
  パリ第1大学（パンテオン・ソルボンヌ）博士研究員 （美術史、グローバル研究）

Andrew Arana（ロレーヌ大学哲学科教授、ポアンカレ文庫長）

Jocelyn Benoist（パリ第一大学哲学科教授）

Estelle Ferrarese（ストラスブール大学政治・社会理論教授）

Marianna Antonutti Marfori（パリ第一大学哲学科及びIHPST教授）

Sandra Laugier（パリ第一大学哲学科教授）

Perig Pitrou（フランス国立科学研究センター人類学上級研究員、オックスフォード・フランス研究所）

Pierre Wagner（パリ第一大学哲学科及びIHPST教授）

Tatsiana Zhurauliova（パリ第一大学芸術学史研究員）

飯田隆（慶應義塾大学名誉教授）

　ほか

Feb. 21st (Fri.) 9:30〜18:30 (JST) / 2月21日（金）9:30〜18:30（予定）

Feb. 22nd (Sat.) 9:30〜18:30 (JST) / 2月22日（土）9:30〜18:30（予定）

Room 313, 1F of Graduate School Building, Mita Campus, Keio Univertsity (No.3 of the campus map)
8-minute walk from Tamachi Station (JR Yamanote Line / JR Keihin Tohoku Line) and
7-minute walk from Mita Station (Toei Asakusa Line / Toei Mita Line) or Akabanebashi Station (Toei Oedo Line).
Use the main gate or the east gate.
Campus Map: https://www.keio.ac.jp/en/maps/mita.html

慶應義塾大学三田キャンパス 大学院棟1F 313教室（キャンパスマップ3番の建物）
JR田町駅から徒歩8分、地下鉄三田駅、赤羽橋駅から徒歩7分。
正門、東門をご利用ください。
キャンパスマップ：https://www.keio.ac.jp/ja/maps/mita.html

Pre-registration required, free of charge / すべて無料、要事前登録
https://forms.gle/a9jrEsDc6RPpYsaHA

The related One-Day Philosophy Meeting is also scheduled on Feb 19th. See the website for the information.

この第４回日仏「論理とリーズニングにおける不一致」コロキアムとは別に、より広いテーマの哲学会議が2月19日に開催されます。詳細は下記URLをご覧ください。

The 19th Feb Meeting Website: https://abelard.flet.keio.ac.jp/2025/02_France-Japan_Philosophy_Meeting

See the Colloquium webpage below for the updated program.

最新版は下記の本会合Websiteでご確認ください。

Website: https://abelard.flet.keio.ac.jp/2025/02_Logic_and_Reasoning

Website(in Japanese / 日本語詳細): https://abelard.flet.keio.ac.jp/2025/02_Logic_and_Reasoning_ja

The first day, Feb. 21st

The second day, Feb. 22nd

Pierre Wagner (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and Institute of History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, and Department of Philosophy)

Mitsuhiro Okada(Keio University)

Koji Mineshima (Keio University)

Hirohiko Abe (Independent Researcher)

Mitsuhiro Okada (Keio University)

Kentaro Ozeki (University of Tokyo/ Keio University)

Koji Mineshima (Keio University)

Hirohiko Abe (Independent Researcher)

Yuichiro Hosokawa (Gunma Prefectural Women's University)

Ryo Ito (Waseda Unversity)

Ryosuke Igarashi (Kyoto University)

Onyu Mikami (Tokyo Metropolitan University)

Koji Mineshima (Keio University)

Mitsuhiro Okada (Keio University)

Kengo Okamoto (Tokyo Metropolitan University)

Kentaro Ozeki (University of Tokyo / Keio University)

Center for Design of Future Symbiosis of Keio University

logic@abelatd.flet.keio.ac.jp

Title: What are people disagreeing about in logical disagreement ?

Abstract:
25 years ago, philosophers started working on disagreement. The most common topics have been disagreement in ethics, philosophy and religion, and disagreement between experts from an epistemological viewpoint. More recently, discussions have started applying the research done in the past 25 years to the specific cases of disagreements in science, and also in mathematics, in logic, and in reasoning. I will focus on the specific case of logical disagreement, which has often been approached from the viewpoint of logical pluralism, also taking into account the normative conception of logic. There are many different ways to have logical disagreement, depending on the philosophical stance which is taken about logic : we may disagree in logic or about logic, we may disagree about the validity of specific logical rules or laws, about which logic is the right logic (in case of logical monism), about which logical system is the most adequate in a specific case, and about the use and the functions of logic. In this talk, I shall distinguish between kinds of logical disagreements and discuss how these distinctions are related to what people think logic is in the first place.

Title: An Examination of the Notions of "Sameness" and "Disagreement" in Rule-Following

Abstract:
TBA

Title: Let’s agree to disagree. Logical pluralism and disagreement

Abstract:
The presentation examines the nature of logical disagreements and, in particular, their significance and authenticity in the context of logical pluralism. First, we will clarify the distinction between the process of engaging in active disagreement and the state of being in an unresolved dispute, particularly when two logicians share an identical logical vocabulary yet are unable to reach any sort of accommodation. We attribute this impasse to the assumption of monism in logic. Therefore, we argue that authentic and substantive disagreements require the recognition of a pluralist approach, which acknowledges the coexistence of multiple formal systems as “logics” while distinguishing between the shared foundational framework of the discipline and the divergent elements that give rise to these debates. In conclusion, the presentation advocates for logical pluralism as essential to understanding and addressing the persistence and authenticity of disagreements in logic.

Title: Disagreement, Concession, and Discourse Relations

Abstract:
TBA

Title: From Disagreement in Rules to Emergence of Appropriate Rules: The Genealogy of Theory of Meaning as Elucidation of Shared Concepts

Abstract:
While disagreements arise at various levels in discussions, particularly critical are disagreements about what counts as relevant evidence or reasons regarding the matter in question. Such conflicts in fundamental commitments, often termed "deep disagreements," have been studied by many researchers. These disagreements are frequently associated with incommensurability and relativism, raising serious questions about how to resolve them when agreement seems impossible.

However, upon reflection, when making arguments in discussions, we are typically unaware of the logical systems or language we rely upon, and attempting to identify these systems or language precisely would prove challenging. Yet even in such circumstances, we continue to engage in arguments, presenting reasons to support our claims and aiming to convince others who hold seemingly opposing views. While deep disagreements might appear to describe a fundamental and hopeless state of division, it is quite reasonable to understand that such situations are commonplace, and we nevertheless strive to develop mutual understanding through dialogue.

This presentation examines "Theory of Meaning", which began with Frege and Wittgenstein and was explicitly advocated by Dummett, as providing a foundation for such mutual understanding, considering our arguments and reasoning activities. Particularly focusing on the concept of elucidation, we highlight how the mutual exchange of seeking and providing reasons in our discussions and theoretical activities involves elucidation necessary for both ensuring shared fundamental concepts and accepting new concepts and usages. This emphasis on elucidation proves crucial in identifying a consistent endeavor in the theory of meaning across Frege, Wittgenstein, and Dummett's work.

Title: "Disagreement about new axioms in mathematics”

Abstract:
Disagreement is widespread in mathematics. In this paper, I focus on disagreement about new axioms, which in our time means chiefly new axioms for set theory. Set theorists seek new axioms because the currently accepted axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZFC) do not resolve key questions about sets like the continuum hypothesis. One way to resolve this disagreement would be to find reasons for choosing one or another new axiom. Philosophers classify such reasons as `intrinsic'' and ``extrinsic’’, where the former are based on intuition or the content of the concept of set, and the latter are based on the value of the consequences such an axiom would have for set theory. Our modest goal in this article is to argue that this distinction, between intrinsic and extrinsic reasons for resolving a disagreement about new axioms, is not well-defined.

Title: How should intuitionists' understanding of classical logic be codified?

Abstract:
Intuitionistic logic is a logic that is strictly weaker than classical logic, where the law of excluded middle is not regarded as valid. The discussions between advocates of classical logic (classists) and those of intuitionistic logic (intuitionist) have occurred in various fields such as the philosophy of mathematics, logic, and language. By viewing this situation neutrally, the following two questions arise: (i) how do classists understand intuitionistic logic? (ii) how do intuitionists understand classical logic? One potential approach to address these questions is to codify an understanding of classists (or, intuitionists) of intuitionistic (or, classical) logic by making use of studies in formal logic. The question (i) seems possible to be answered by employing the model-theoretic semantics, such as the Kripke semantics. Thus, we tackle (ii) in this presentation. Since BHK interpretation interprets a logical connective in terms of proofs and is known as an interpretation for intuitionists, it is a reasonable direction to explore the question (ii) with respect to a proof theory. In this presentation, we introduce various proof theories that are known for seeming to help us to tackle the question (ii), provided by Humberstone (1979), Prawitz (2015), and Kurokawa (2009), etc., and categorize them into three types. Moreover, we contend that one type of proof theories are better than the others.

Title: Disagreement in Reasoning from Epistemological Viewpoints: Sentimentalist Epistemology and the Humility Approach to Deep Disagreement

Abstract:
I address epistemic disagreements where multiple subjects have conflicting views on what doxastic attitudes to take. Distinguishing two kinds of disagreements, that is, that in the content of belief and that in reasoning, we can easily see that the latter begs the deeper conflict. If we disagree whether we should believe that p or not, we can discuss by giving and asking for reasons, thus assessing them. There remains the possibility that each part comes into agreement to believe or not to believe that p on the same ground. However, if we disagree on what should be taken as reasons, that is disagree in reasoning, there seems no rational criterion available.

This observation follows what Robert Fogelin calls “deep disagreement”, or disagreement on frameworks. In deep disagreement, unlike normal ones, many beliefs and preferences which constitute argumentative contexts are not shared, which makes rational resolution difficult. Fogelin, therefore concludes that deep disagreements are not subject to rational resolution.

Instead of seeking for rational resolution, Drew Johnson advocates the humility approach, claiming that being epistemically humble enables a non-rational yet less violent way to resolution by making one realize the groundlessness of their perspectives and therefore to be open to other perspectives. However, as Johnson admits, it remains an issue to what extent we might have an obligation to change the views when facing a subject with different perspectives, especially those who have morally worse worldviews. More importantly, when reasoning is made pointful by such a solution, it needs to be addressed how being epistemically humble can constitute the normativity of reasoning.

In this talk, I respond to these issues by developing sentimentalist epistemology, which claims empathic receptivity provides epistemic justification. According to sentimentalist epistemology, being empathetically receptive to other perspectives constitutes an epistemic norm, while it is justified to reject out of hand the views of closed-minded people, who show the lack of receptive attitudes necessary for arguments.

Understood properly, empathic receptivity serves at the core of the humility approach because being receptive to other perspectives is essentially involved in realizing the rational groundlessness of one’s own perspective. I therefore argue that an epistemically humble attitude via empathic receptivity itself provides epistemic justification and that one need not be epistemically open to closed-minded people.

Title: What was Wittgenstein doing when he talked about meaning and use?

Abstract:
I experience bewilderment whenever I am asked to explain the main points of Wittgenstein's philosophy. It is not because Wittgenstein's philosophy is too complex to be summarized in a few words. There are many philosophical claims usually attributed to Wittgenstein such as the impossibility of a private langauage and the identification of the meaning with its use. However, I hesitate to say that Wittgenstein advanced such claims.
In this talk, I want to find out the source of my bewilderment by considering the nature of Wittgenstein's "work" and one particular example of Wittgensteinian "claims", namely, the identification of the meaning of a word with its use, in the light of that.

Title: Disagreement on mathematical explanation

Abstract:
Most contemporary philosophers agree that we should adopt a bottom-up approach to explanation in science and mathematics, which starts from case studies in the practice to extract a definition of explanation, rather than starting from a pre-conceived notion and applying it to the practice. The literature on mathematical explanation has developed especially in the last 25 years, and has been focusing on collecting case studies in order to propose accounts (and sometimes models) of mathematical explanation. In this talk I will propose an analysis of what these accounts disagree about. Firstly, some accounts hold that understanding is a necessary component of explanation, while others do not; I will argue that this is a merely verbal dispute, so there is no genuine disagreement because different meanings are attached to the word “explanation”. Secondly, I will argue that mathematical explanation is relative to the goals of the enquiry: for example, in certain cases a proof that connects different areas of mathematics is more explanatory than an elementary one (or vice versa), or an existential proof that provides a construction is more explanatory than one that generalises to infinite cases but does not provide such a construction. I will consider some case studies and evaluate in which cases we can talk about genuine disagreement concerning mathematical explanation.

Title: How making the hidden context explicit helps mutual understanding of different logics

Abstract:
We first review our previous work to explain how making a certain hidden context explicit helps for mutual understanding of different logics in merging logical languages of different logical cultures, such as, e.g., the classicists’ and the intuitionists’, as a response to Quine’s argument on the “verbal dispute” issue. As a key example, we consider the logical-culture-dependent notion of “contradiction” or “incompatibility” as a hidden context, which, we claim, helps mutual understanding the difference of logical constants of different logical cultures. We discuss similar situations appearing in various other merged logical languages.

Title: The dispute about the meaning of reality (Metaphysics)

Abstract:
I will discuss the limitations of modern and postmodern approach to reality. I will argue that reality is not a passive object to be observed, but rather an active factor in our understanding. My picture rests on an instrumental -organon- view of concepts, that are tools for grasping reality and require real ways to be used that always draw upon the context and depend on definite interactions. However, as far as use is essentially required in order to make sense of concepts, a dispute may arise about what is legitimate use in a definite situation. So, as far as reality never comes down to ‘our’ -private- reality, making sense of it always requires acknowledging the possibility of other uses, as others’ uses in the context of shared situations.

Title: Disagreement Among Analyses of Counterfactuals

Abstract:
In this talk, I introduce my new article titled ‘Disagreement Among Analyses of Counterfactuals’ (Hosokawa, forthcoming), which is a result of our research program for elucidation of disagreement in logic and reasoning. Most of its points were presented at the meeting in Paris last year, so I shall review them briefly and then present the new prospects derived from them in the article.

Title: An Inferentialist Account of Understanding

Abstract:
In this paper, I present an account of what it is to understand a rule, by developing some key notions of Robert Brandom's inferentialism. I also argue that once the account is accepted, we can differentiate one's following a rule from one's understanding it whilst explaining these sorts of acts as embedded within the "game of giving and asking for reasons".

Title: Meaning, Concepts and Disagreement in Logic

Abstract:
Mathematical logic is now a broad area including a lot of logics. As is well known, some logic adopts a principle which is incompatible with others, so there is a disagreement in logic at least on a superficial level. It has been discussed whether genuine disagreement exists in logic, and the arguments denying genuine disagreement in logic are often based on the following premise: if there is a dispute over a basic logical law then the dispute arises in virtue of the disagreement about the meaning of logical expressions involved in the law. However, it is exceptional that logicians in such a dispute consider themselves to be engaged in the dispute concerning the meaning of certain expressions; rather, they claim to be engaged in the dispute on the subject itself, namely, the logical concepts involved in the law. On the basis of this observation, we argue against the premise that a dispute over a logical law arises in virtue of the disagreement about the meaning of logical expressions involved. Moreover, we note the fact that logical concepts are often not completely grasped even by prominent logicians at the time. We then emphasize the open-endedness of dependent type theory as a clue to formalize logical investigation in such a transition period.

Title: Evaluating normative reasoning of Large Language Models-a progress report of the NeuBAROCO Project (tentative title)

Abstract:
TBA

The discussion will explore the ways in which normativity is immanent in forms of life. How do norms emerge in life itself, how are they expressed by individuals, how are they embodied in institutions and different cultures? The speakers, who come from philosophy of language, political philosophy, anthropology, ethics and art studies, will discuss the plasticity and evolution of life norms, as well as cases of confrontation, divergence or rupture of life forms. The aim of the panel is to shed light on the specific normativity of forms of life, social or biological, and thus on their conflicts and mutations in the present.

Panelists

• Sandra Laugier, Professor of Philosophy, Université Paris 1 Pantheon Sorbonne (philosophy of ordinary language, Wittgenstein and ethics).

• Estelle Ferrarese, Professor of Philosophy, Université de Picardie, Institut Universitaire de France (political philosophy and critical theory)

• Perig Pitrou, CNRS Senior Researcher, Maison française d'Oxford, University of Oxford (anthropology of life)

• Tatsiana Zhurauliova, Postdoctoral Researcher, Université Paris 1 Pantheon Sorbonne (History of Art, Global Studies).

本パネルディスカッションでは、生活形式/生命形態における規範性の内在について探求します。規範は生活そのものの中でどのようにして生じるのか、個々人はどのようにして規範を表現するのか、規範は制度や異なる文化の中でどのように具現化されるのか。言語哲学、政治哲学、人類学、倫理学、芸術学を専門とするパネリストが、生命の規範の可塑性と進化、そして生活形式/生命形態における対立、乖離、断絶の事例について議論します。このパネルの目的は、社会的なもの、あるいは生物学的なものなど、生活形式/生命形態における特定の規範性、そしてそれらに起因する現在の葛藤や変異に光を当てることです。

パネリスト

• サンドラ・ロジエ パリ第1大学パンテオン・ソルボンヌ校哲学教授 （日常言語哲学、ウィトゲンシュタイン、倫理学）
• エステル・フェラレーゼ ピカルディ大学、フランス大学研究所哲学教授 （政治哲学、批判理論）
• ペリグ・ピトルー フランス国立科学研究センター上級研究員、オックスフォード・フランス研究所（オックスフォード大学） （生活人類学）
• タチアナ・ジュラウリョーバ パリ第1大学（パンテオン・ソルボンヌ）博士研究員 （美術史、グローバル研究）